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Glass v. Goeckel, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 1229
(Mich. App. May 13, 2004).
Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.
In May 2004, a Michigan Court of Appeals ruled
that the general public does not have a right to tra-
verse the shore of Lake Huron between the ordi-
nary high water mark and the water’s edge. The
court confirmed that in Michigan lakefront proper-
ty owners have the exclusive right of use to the land
running to the water’s edge, subject only to the
public’s right of access for navigation.
Background
Richard and Kathleen Goeckel own land abutting
Lake Huron in Alcona County, Michigan. In 2001,
Joan Glass, a neighbor of the Goeckels, sued the
Goeckels claiming they were denying her access to
Lake Huron guaranteed by an express fifteen-foot
easement across the Goeckels’ property “for ingress
and egress to Lake Huron” contained in Glass’s
deed. Glass presented evidence that the Goeckels
were restricting her access to the Lake by parking
cars in front of the entrance to the easement and
refusing to trim tree branches along the easement.
Glass also claimed that the Goeckels were interfer-
ing with her right to walk along the beach. 
The parties eventually resolved their dispute
regarding the express easement. The Goeckels
agreed to prune the pathway to insure Glass unim-
peded access to Lake Huron. Glass could also use
the beach portion of the fifteen-foot easement for
Morgan v. Planning Department, County of Kauai, 86
P.3d 982 (Haw. 2004).
Daniel Park, 2nd Year Law Student at University of
Hawaii School of Law
On March 24, 2004, the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i
ruled that the Planning Commission of the County
of Kauai (Commission) possesses the inherent
authority to modify a validly issued Special
Management Area (SMA) Use permit due to
changed conditions. The supreme court based its
decision on the language and context of Hawai‘i’s
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)1, as well as
the Planning Commission’s Rules of Practice and
Procedure (PCRPP).
Background
For many oceanfront property owners, shoreline
erosion threatens significant damage to their prop-
erty. In response to this threat, owners usually con-
struct some type of structure for protection. In
September 1981, several property owners in Kauai
(the seawall owners) located within a SMA applied
for a SMA Use permit, required for any develop-
ment within a SMA, to construct a seawall for
Kauai Planning Commission Can
Modify SMA Use Permit 
See Kauai, page 18
See High Water Mark, page 6
No Right to Walk between High
Water Mark and Water’s Edge
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Barges Below High
Water Mark Do Not
Infringe on
Property Rights
Romeo v. Sherry, 308 F. Supp. 2d 128 (E.D. N.Y. 2004). 
Lauren Cozzolino, 2nd Year Law Student at University
of Connecticut School of Law
The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York found that the State of New
York owns the land between the high and low water
marks (the “foreshore”) unless specifically granted
by the state. The court also found that waterfront
property owners (riparian owners) only have a right
to reasonable access to the adjacent navigable
waterway. 
Background
Plaintiff Joseph Romeo owns waterfront property in
Tottenville, New York along the Arthur Kill. Arthur
Kill is a navigable waterway that divides Staten
Island, New York from New Jersey. When Romeo
purchased the waterfront property in August of
1994, fourteen steel and wooden barges lay offshore
in plain sight. All but five of these barges were
removed by their owners at Romeo’s request. The
remaining barges lay on the foreshore, or the land
between the high and low water marks. Romeo con-
tends that these barges infringed on his riparian
right of access to the waterway. He had wanted to
use the properties for the development of a myriad
of businesses including a wedding chapel, photog-
raphy studio, restaurant and a community center.
He argued to the court that he was unable to use the
land as he had hoped because of the presence of the
barges. Romeo also alleged that he had ownership
of the foreshore and that the presence of the barges
constituted trespass and nuisance. 
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Riparian Rights 
Under New York law, a riparian owner’s right of
access to navigable waters is not absolute. Romeo
argued that any interference, however slight, is an
interference with his riparian rights. The court dis-
agreed, pointing out that “well over a century of
common law adjudication has established the ripar-
i an  owner ’ s  r i gh t  to  r easonab le  acces s . ” 1
“Reasonable access” is defined on a case-by-case
basis. The court stated that the presence of the
abandoned barges offshore Romeo’s property did
not prevent the plaintiff from accessing Arthur Kill
because the barges only blocked 25 percent of the
plaintiff ’s access to the navigable water. The court
also highlighted the fact that Romeo did not pre-
sent any evidence that he had ever lived at the
waterfront property in question or that he had ever
attempted to launch or land a watercraft. After
weighing these factors, the court held that the pres-
ence of abandoned and sunken barges on the fore-
shore did not violate the owner’s riparian rights
because riparian owners only have the right to rea-
sonable access to navigable waters. 
Ownership of the Foreshore 
In addition to claiming that his riparian rights were
interfered with, Romeo filed an action for trespass
and nuisance. In order to successfully bring these
claims, Romeo had to prove that he had ownership
rights to the land where the barges rested. Citing
the United States Supreme Court, the New York
district court pointed out that “unless specifically
granted, States are the owners of all lands subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide.”2 Romeo admitted he
had no grant from the State but contended that he
had a right to the foreshore that derived from a
colonial grant that was transferred to a previous
owner of the waterfront property. This colonial
grant was given to Captain Christopher Billopp in
1687 by English Royal Governor James Dongan.
The grant conveyed much of the southern portion
of Staten Island and stated that it included land
“unto [the] low water marke.”3
The court was not persuaded by Romeo’s argu-
ment that he had a right to the foreshore based on
this grant. This was due in part to the fact that
Captain Billopp was convicted of treason in 1779
for fighting with the British against American
colonists. He was banished from the State of New
York and his property was forfeited to the people of
New York. In 1784, New York State Commissioners
sold the Billopp property to Thomas McFarren.
McFarren’s deed did not grant him land below the
high-water mark. More importantly, New York
courts have held that large grants of seacoast land
granted for private purposes violate the public trust
doctrine.4 Therefore, Romeo could not rely on the
Billopp grant for ownership of the foreshore. 
Romeo made an additional claim that he
obtained title to the foreshore through adverse pos-
session. Romeo was unsuccessful in this attempt
because “navigable waterways are inalienable except
by grant.”5 The court found for the defendants
because Romeo was unable to prove that he owned
the foreshore. In short, the court reasoned that with-
out a valid grant the State owns the foreshore. 
Conclusion
The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York concluded that under New
York law, a riparian owner only has the right to rea-
sonable access of adjacent navigable waters. The
presence of the abandoned and sunken barges on
the foreshore did not violate Joseph Romeo’s rea-
sonable access. In addition, the court found that the
abandoned and sunken barges on the foreshore did
not constitute trespass or nuisance because Romeo
did not own the foreshore.
Endnotes
1.  Romeo v. Sherry, 308 F. Supp. 2d 128, 144
(E.D.N.Y. 2004).
2.  Id. at 141. 
3. Id. at 135.
4.  Id. at 142, citing Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton
St. Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 296 (1936). 
5.  Id. at 147.
Photo courtesy of Sean Linehan, NOAA, NGS, Remote Sensing
Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, 10
Cal. Rptr. 3d 356 (Cal. App. 2004).
Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.
In February, the California Court of Appeal for the
Sixth Appellate District ruled that the California
Coastal Commission did not have the authority to
require Santa Cruz County to impose additional
zoning criteria for timber production within the
coastal zone. Additionally the court held that the
County’s zoning regulations were expressly pre-
empted by the Forest Practice Act of 1973 (FPA).
Background
In 1998, the Santa Cruz County Timber Technical
Advisory Committee recommended that the
County adopt additional timber regulations. The
County initially sought to proceed through the
State Forestry Board (Board). The County submit-
ted proposed forest practice rules to the Board as
authorized by the FPA. Under the FPA, counties
may recommend forest practice rules and regula-
tions to the Board which the Board shall adopt if
the proposed rules are consisted with the purposes
of the FPA and necessary to protect local needs.1
The Board accepted some of the County’s proposed
rules, but rejected others including a riparian “no-
cut” corridor and limits on helicopter operations.
Foiled by the Board, the County adopted
Ordinance 4529 banning timber harvesting in des-
ignated riparian areas in November 1998. In
November 1999, the County adopted two more
ordinances affecting timber harvesting. Ordinance
4571 replaced Ordinance 4529 and continued the
ban on timber harvesting in riparian corridors.
Ordinance 4572 limited the area in which heli-
copter operations could take place.
Then in December 1999, the County amended
the County’s General Plan/Local Coastal Program
(LCP) and zoning code. The amendments limited
timber harvesting to properties, both inside and
outside the coastal zone, zoned Timber Production
(TP) or Mineral Extraction Industrial, and proper-
t ies  outside the coastal  zone zoned Parks ,
Recreation, and Open Space.2 The County forward-
ed the amendments to the California Coastal
Commission (Commission) for approval. The
Commission approved the amendments in 2000,
but only after the County had incorporated two
modifications proposed by the Commission which
imposed limitations on applications for timber
production zoning within the coastal zone.
The Lawsuits
In 1998, Big Creek Lumber Company filed suit
challenging Ordinance 4529 and several other
actions of Santa Cruz County based on violations
of the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA) and preemption. In 2000, the Central
Coast Forest Association (CCFA) challenged
Ordinances 4571 and 4572 and the Commission’s
certification, also on the basis of the CEQA and
preemption. The court later consolidated Big
Creek’s and CCFA’s actions. 
Big Creek and CCFA forwarded several argu-
ments. First, they argued that the County’s ripari-
an corridor and helicopter operation regulations
violated the Timberland Productivity Act of 1982
(TPA). Big Creek and CCFA also argued that the
County’s new zoning regulations violated the FPA.
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the modifications
required by the Commission as a prerequisite for
certification illegally imposed additional zoning
criteria for timber production lands in violation of
the TPA.
The trial court found for Big Creek and the
CCFA with regard to the riparian corridor and
helicopter regulations and the Commission’s modi-
fications. The trial court, however, held that the
County’s zoning ordinances which merely limited
timber operations to certain zones were not pre-
Page 4 Volume 3, No. 2  The SandBar
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empted by state law. Big Creek and CCFA appealed
the decision of the trial court, arguing that state
law preempted the County’s ordinances in their
entirety. Santa Cruz County and the Commission
also appealed the court’s decision.
Coastal Commission Modifications
The Commission has chief respon-
sibility for regulating the use and
development of California’s coastal
zone. Local governments partici-
pate in the regulation of the coastal
zone through the development of
local coastal plans, which must be
certified by the Commission. The
local plans may be amended by the
local governments, but amend-
ments are ineffective until certified
by the Commission.
As a condition of certification,
the Commission required Santa
Cruz County to impose limitations
on applications for timber produc-
tion zoning in the coastal zone,
including requiring TP rezoning
applications to be processed as LCP amendments.
The court held, however, that the Commission
does not have the authority to condition certifica-
tion on the imposition of additional conditions.
Under the TPA, timberland production zones are
restricted to the growing and harvesting of timber
and compatible uses.3 Counties are authorized to
adopt criteria for timberland production zoning,
but the county “shall not impose any requirements
in addition to those listed in [the TPA].”4 Because
the county did not have the power to impose addi-
tional criteria and the Commission may not
require a local government to exercise power it
does not have,5 Santa Cruz County’s adoption of
additional criteria is invalid.
Preemption
A county “may make and enforce within its limits all
local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and reg-
ulations not in conflict with general laws.”6 Pursuant
to this authority, Santa Cruz County adopted several
measures regulating timber harvesting in the
County, including zone districts, riparian corridors,
and helicopter operations. The court determined
that these measures are in conflict with general laws,
specifically the TPA and the FPA, and therefore pre-
empted by California state law. 
Local measures are preempted by state law
when “local measures duplicate or contradict state
law, or when they invade a field that the state has
fully occupied, either expressly or implicitly.”7 The
zone districts adopted by the County restricted log-
ging to designated areas. The court held that these
zone districts regulated the conduct of timber oper-
ations by prohibiting logging in certain areas.
Local regulation of the conduct of timber opera-
tions is prohibited by the FPA.8 The County’s zone
district regulations contradicted the FPA by autho-
rizing the local regulation of timber operations and
are preempted by the FPA.
Santa Cruz County also adopted a riparian
ordinance, which applied within timber produc-
tion zones, prohibiting logging within 50 feet of a
perennial stream or 30 feet of an intermittent
stream. The court determined that the FPA pre-
empted the riparian ordinance, because the
County’s buffer width was different from the width
of the buffer set by the State Forestry Board.
Consequently, logging near streams allowable
under state law could be prohibited by the Santa
Cruz ordinance, clearly contradicting state law.
Finally, Ordinance 4572 limited helicopter
operations to qualifying parcels within the bound-
aries of an approved timber harvest plan. As men-
See Santa Cruz, page 7
Photo courtesy of NOAA’s America's Coastlines Collection, Santa Cruz County, California,
ca. 1905
sunbathing and other recreational purposes. The
Goeckels, however, continued to object to Glass’s
use of the beach in front of their property. The trial
court found for Glass, ruling that she has the “right
to use the shore of Lake Huron lying below and
lakewards of the natural ordinary high water mark
for pedestrian travel.”1 The Goeckels appealed the
decision of the trial court.
Public Access to Lake Huron
The Goeckels argued that, as riparian owners,
they have the exclusive right to use the land up to
the water’s edge and can therefore prevent Glass
and other members of the general public from
walking above the water’s edge. The Michigan
Court of Appeals agreed, holding that riparian
owners have exclusive use of the dry land to the
water’s edge, subject only to the public trust doc-
trine. Under the public trust doctrine, the state of
Michigan holds title to the waters and the sub-
merged lands of the Great Lakes within its bor-
ders in trust for the public.
According to the court, the dividing line
between the public trust doctrine and riparian
rights along Lake Huron is the water ’s edge.2
Therefore, the Goeckels and other riparian owners
have the exclusive right to use the dry land to the
water’s edge. It is important to note, however, that
the court held that this right of exclusive use does
not correspond with actual ownership of the land.
The land upon which Glass sought to walk had not
always been dry land. The disputed strip emerged
as the waters of Lake Huron receded. 
The general rule is that “the title of the riparian
owner follows the shoreline under what has been
graphically called a ‘moveable freehold.”3 The rea-
soning of the court is not entirely clear, but it
appears Michigan deviates from this general rule
with regard to land formed by the recession of
water. While riparian owners gain the right to use
the land that emerges as the water level of Lake
Huron falls, the actual title to the previously sub-
merged land remains with the state.4 Riparian own-
ers have the right to use the now-dry land and
exclude others, but they do not own the land and
they will lose the right of exclusive use when the
waters rise.
This is an interesting interpretation of the
public trust doctrine. In a majority of states, the
public trust doctrine requires the state to hold nav-
igable waters, the submerged lands underneath,
and adjacent lands below the ordinary high water
mark in trust for the public. Private individuals
cannot own land below the high water mark or
Page 6 Volume 3, No. 2  The SandBar
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exclude the general public from that land. In
Michigan, however, the state’s title to land below
the high water mark is “subject to the riparian
owner’s exclusive use, except as it pertains to nav-
igation issues.”5 This interpretation is narrow,
merely protecting the public’s right of access to
the Great Lakes for navigation and not for fishing,
recreation or other purposes. 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.32502
Glass countered the Goeckels’ arguments by
claiming that Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.32502 pro-
vides her with a statutory right to traverse the
Goeckels’ property anywhere between the high
water mark and the water’s edge. The court dis-
agreed. The court held that § 324.32502 simply
sets forth the rules of construction for Part 325 of
the Michigan Natural Resources and Environ-
mental Protection Act. Section 324.32502 identi-
fies lands covered by the Act, provides for the
state’s ability to sell and lease unpatented sub-
merged lands, provides for the private and public
use of waters over patented and unpatented lands,
and preserves traditional riparian rights. This
section, however, creates no substantive rights
and “contains no provision guaranteeing any
member of the public the right to walk on a beach
fronting private property along one of the Great
Lakes.”6
Conclusion
The Goeckels, as riparian owners, have the exclu-
sive right to the use and enjoyment of the dry land
to the water’s edge. Glass and other members of the
general public have the right to use the lake bottom
until it reaches dry land for the purpose of navigat-
ing Lake Huron. 
This case is still moving through the Michigan
courts. On June 24, 2004, Glass’s attorneys filed
an application for leave to appeal with the
Michigan Supreme Court. The Law Center will
continue to track this litigation and share infor-
mation as it becomes available via the web and
other publications.
Endnotes
1.  Glass v. Goeckel, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 1229 at
*4 (Mich. App. May 13, 2004).
2.  Id. at *23.
3.  Id. at *16, citing Peterman v. Dept. of Natural
Resources, 521 N.W.2d 499 (Mich. 1994).
4.  Id. at *23.
5.  Id.
6.  Id. at * 27.
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tioned above, the FPA prohibits local regulation of
the conduct of timber operations, which includes
the removal of timber.9 The court held that
Ordinance 4572 attempts to regulate the conduct of
timber operations by regulating the removal of
timber and is therefore preempted by the FPA.
Conclusion
The California Court of Appeals held that the
Commission did not have the authority to require
Santa Cruz County to impose additional criteria
regarding TP rezoning. Additionally, the local
measures adopted by the County were an imper-
missible attempt to regulate the conduct of timber
harvesting and preempted by the FPA.
Endnotes
1.  CAL. PUB. RESOURCES CODE § 4516.5 (2004).
2.  Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, 10
Cal. Rptr. 3d 356, 362 (Cal. App. 2004).
3.  CAL. GOV. CODE § 51115 (2004).
4.  Id. at § 51113, subd. (c).
5.  CAL PUB. RESOURCES CODE § 30005.5 (2004).
6.  Cal. Const. Art. XI, § 7.
7.  Big Creek, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 381.
8.  CAL. PUB. RESOURCES CODE § 4516.5 sudb. (d)
(2004).
9.  Id. at § 4527.
Santa Cruz, from page 5
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Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818 (R.I. 2004).
Lance M. Young, 2nd Year Law Student at Roger
Williams School of Law
Last year, commercial fishermen in Rhode Island
challenged a legislative act that prohibited them
from using a self-contained underwater breathing
apparatus (SCUBA) to harvest shellfish in coastal
saltwater ponds. A superior court judge declared
the legislation unconstitutional because it unrea-
sonably deprived the divers of their occupations.
This spring, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
reversed that decision, holding that the legislature
has broad power to regulate fishing and the judicia-
ry is limited in its ability to scrutinize those acts.
Background
Potter Pond, known for its abundant fish stock, is
the deepest of several salt ponds in Rhode Island.
It attracts both commercial and recreational fisher-
men, supports recreational boaters and is sur-
rounded by residential and vacation homes. Some
commercial fishermen used SCUBA diving equip-
ment as a means to harvest shellfish from the pond.
In 2000, residents started to complain that SCUBA
diving fishermen failed to comply with quantity
limits, neglected to use proper safety measures,
and trespassed on private property. They claimed
that the divers’ failure to comply with quantity
limits damaged recreational fishing and that
unsafe diving practices posed a safety hazard to
boaters. Concerns increased when residents
learned that the Division of Fish and Wildlife was
considering the rescission of a ban on SCUBA har-
vesting in three other Rhode Island ponds. 
In 2001, the Rhode Island General Assembly
enacted a statute that prohibited the use of
SCUBA diving equipment for harvesting shellfish
in Green Hill  Pond, Quonochontaug Pond,
Charlestown Pond, and Potter Pond.1 The state
defended the legislation on the grounds that it had
a duty to compromise between resident concerns
and SCUBA diving fishermen. The effect of the
legislation, however, seemed to benefit only the
residents. Furthermore, the General Assembly
defended the legislation on the basis that it retains
the power to regulate fishing for environmental
resource protection.
Before the trial court, the fishermen argued
that the legislation was not related to a legitimate
state interest. They provided expert witnesses and
a Department of Environmental Management
report to establish a healthy shellfish population in
the ponds and the adequacy of catch limits as a reg-
ulatory tool. The fishermen argued that the state
could not legitimately claim it was protecting
shellfish populations with the new legislation, as
existing laws already restricted catch and no other
method of harvesting shellfish was restricted. The
superior court judge granted summary judgment
in favor of the SCUBA diving fishermen, ruling
that the legislation unconstitutionally deprived the
SCUBA diving fishermen of their occupations.
The Rhode Island Attorney General appealed to
the state Supreme Court.
Right to Fish, Equal Protection, and Due Process
On appeal the fishermen claimed the ban violated
their constitutional right to fish. The Rhode Island
Constitution protects citizens’ “rights of fishery,
and privileges of the shore.”2 The fishermen
argued that the legislative ban on SCUBA fishing
served no legitimate state interest because the use
of SCUBA equipment does not jeopardize shellfish
populations or raise public health concerns.
Therefore, they argued, the public gained nothing
from the legislation and a single class of fishermen
was illegally discriminated against. Because the
enactment had the effect of discriminating against
them, the fishermen also contended that it violated
their constitutional guarantee of equal protection
under the law and due process rights. 
The Court’s Analysis
The Rhode Island Supreme Court unanimously
upheld the legislation’s validity and reversed the
superior court. First, it agreed with the Attorney
SCUBA Shellfishing Ban
Withstands Challenge
General that the General Assembly has broad and
full authority to regulate the state’s resources. The
standard for reviewing legislation in Rhode Island
requires that the plaintiff prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the legislative act violates either
the State or United States Constitution before judi-
cial intervention is appropriate.3
In its review, the court distinguished between
strict scrutiny and minimal scrutiny of legislation.
Strict scrutiny is appropriate when a statute
infringes upon an “enumerated constitutional
right” like the freedom of speech or a right “funda-
mental to our concept of ordered liberty,” like the
right to privacy.4 Strict scrutiny would also be
applied if there was suspicion of discrimination
against a protected class, such as race, religious
affiliation, or gender. Otherwise, the court claims,
the legislature can enact laws that affect certain
classes of individuals differently than others with
only minimal judicial scrutiny. 
The court held that the statute in question did
not infringe on any enumerated or fundamental
right and the fishermen did not fall into any sus-
pect classification. The Rhode Island Constitution
protects the fundamental right of all inhabitants of
equal access to the State’s fisheries. The court rea-
soned that the statute does not deny the fishermen
equal access because they are still entitled to har-
vest shellfish. Nor does the legislative act discrimi-
nate against one class of fishermen, such as com-
mercial fishermen. It merely regulates a method of
fishing that is applicable to all citizens.
The  cour t  a l so  no ted  tha t  the  S ta te
Constitution imposed on the legislature the duty
to protect fish resources by providing “adequate
resource planning and control and regulation.”5
The constitutional responsibility is not limited to
regulating catch and size limitations. The state
can also regulate methods of fishing to plan for
sustained future resources.
Finally, for a plaintiff to claim violation of due
process, he or she must show that a statute violates
a protected interest like liberty or property. In the
alternative, the statute must be proven “arbitrary
and unreasonable” because it had no relation to
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.6
Because the statute was related to the conservation
of shellfish and boating safety, the court found no
viable due process claim.  
Conclusion
Tension is bound to arise when different user
groups utilize the same resource. The Rhode Island
General Assembly responded to the tension that
arose between property owners and commercial
fishermen that utilized Potter Pond. The enacted
legislation, which banned the practice of harvest-
ing shellfish using SCUBA gear, was validated on
the grounds that the act intended to protect future
shellfish populations. This seems duplicative, as
the shell fishermen suggest, because the SCUBA
diving fishermen are already restricted by the same
catch and size limits as other fishermen. State law
also exists that regulates SCUBA diving safety7 and
trespass. However, because the “right of fishery” is
not an enumerated or fundamental right and fish-
ermen are not a protected class of citizens, this
group of plaintiffs was unable to challenge legisla-
tive motive in the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
Endnotes
1. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-6-30 (2004).
2. R.I. CONST. ART. I, § 17.
3.  Gorham v. Robinson, 186 A. 832, 837 (R.I. 1936).
4.  Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 823 (R.I. 2004).
5. R.I. CONST. ART. I, § 17.
6.  Cherenzia, 847 A.2d at 826.
7. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-22-24 (2004).
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Diver riding a shrimp net watches a turtle escape through the excluder
device. Photo courtesy of NOAA’s OAR/National Undersea Research
Program (NURP)
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The Legal Status of Autonomous
Underwater Vehicles1
Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.
AUVs, Autonomous Underwater Vehicles, are the
cutting edge of technology used to explore the
world’s oceans. Today, AUVs can explore areas of
the oceans scientists only dreamed about mere
decades ago. These robots provide unprecedented
access to hydrothermal vents and other mysteries
of the deep. AUVs can swim under the polar ice
caps and venture into underwater canyons. But
scientists are not the only group benefiting from
these machines. Once the exclusive purview of the
United States Navy and academic institutions,
recent advances are bringing AUVs into the com-
mercial sector. AUVs can search for offshore oil
and mineral deposits, lay submarine cables, and
search for mines. Private individuals and corpora-
tions can now purchase AUVs for use in salvage
operations, underwater archaeology, or simple
exploration. The possibilities appear limitless and
the benefits incalculable.
Unlike tethered and remotely operated vehi-
cles which are a simple extension of the research
vessel, AUVs are, and legally should be, considered
separate entities. AUVs, as the name suggests, are
designed to operate freely in the vast oceans.
Ideally, AUVs would be released and tracked from
shore, eliminating the need for a costly support
vessel. The AUV’s autonomous nature, however,
creates a regulatory gap. AUVs, as discussed in
more detail below, may or may not be vessels as
defined by U.S. maritime laws. The use of AUVs is
virtually unregulated by the federal government,
mostly due to a combination of the newness of the
technology, difficulties with classification, and the
unwillingness of overburdened federal agencies to
incur additional responsibilities.
No legal framework currently exists to regulate
the use of AUVs. Permits and licenses are only
required in a few narrow circumstances. While
there is no indication that the oceans are in danger
of being overrun by AUVs, their growing availabil-
ity and popularity warrant investigation into the
potential regulatory implications of the wide-
spread use of AUVs.
Technology often outpaces regulatory regimes,
whose adaptability is hindered by the legislative
process and administrative agency resources. In
general, the international treaties and domestic
law governing marine activities apply only to ves-
sels. While AUVs are autonomous vehicles that
operate on and below the service of the ocean, the
application of U.S. maritime laws, including the
Internat ional  Regulat ions  for  Prevent ing
Collisions at Sea (COLREG), is unclear because
these machines may not be considered “vessels”
under U.S. law. 
A vessel “includes every description of water-
craft or other artificial contrivance used, or capa-
ble of being used, as a means of transportation on
water.”2 The “vessel” test is simple - is the struc-
ture “fairly engaged in or suitable for, commerce
or navigation and as a means of transportation on
water?”3 For a boat, barge, or other floating struc-
ture to be considered a vessel, “it must have some
relation to commerce or navigation, or at least
some connection with a vessel employed in trade.”4
The current AUV models have no such connec-
tion to commerce or navigation. AUVs are used to
study and explore the ocean environment. The
majority, due to their size and design, are unable
to be used as a means of transportation for goods
or people on water. Small AUVs used for scientific
purposes are probably not vessels subject to U.S.
maritime regulations and need not comply with
the COLREGs.
Some AUVs, however, could be considered ves-
sels and would be required to comply with the
COLREGs and other maritime laws. For example,
research is underway to develop cargo carrying
AUVs to “deliver payloads or cargoes [sonar arrays,
underwater cables, scientific instruments, etc.] to
places that manned ships or submarines cannot
operator cost-effectively or safely.”5 Already the
Canadian Defense Research Establishment and the
U.S. Office of Naval Research have proved that
AUVs can be used to lay cables. In the spring of 1996,
during a cable laying mission in the Artic, the Theseus
AUV laid two fibre optic cables under the polar ice
cap over a distance of 175 km. The ability of certain
classes of AUVs to operate in commercial activities,
such as laying cables and carrying cargo, significant-
ly alters the legal analysis of whether AUVs are ves-
sels. If AUVs are used to carry cargo, a strong argu-
ment can be made that they are also vessels capable
of being used for transportation on the water.
So let’s assume for a moment that AUVs are
vessels. One class clearly would have to adhere to
the COLREG provisions – the semi-submersibles.
A semi-submersible AUV is “designed to operate
like a snorkeling submarine and consequently, is
limited to operations near the sea surface.”6 Rule
22 of the COLREGs requires inconspicuous, part-
ly submerged vessels to display a white all-round
light visible up to a minimum of three miles.
Vessels are also required to carry equipment for
sound signals which varies depending on the size
of the vessel. Rule 33 states that vessels less than
twelve meters long are not obliged to carry the
bells and whistles required on larger vessels.
However, if the vessel is not so equipped, it must
be provided with some other means of making an
efficient sound signal. Semi-submersible AUVs
should, therefore, also be outfitted with some type
of sound signaling device. 
Unlike the semi-sub-
mersible AUVs, the majority of
AUVs are designed to operate
completely under the water. It
is important to note that the
COLREGs are only applicable
to vessels operating on the
water. There are no lighting
and signal requirements for
underwater operations, unless
a  ve s se l  on  the  sur face  i s
engaged in underwater opera-
tions, such as fishing or laying
cables. Submarines only have
to display lights when operat-
ing on the surface. There may
be situations, however, when
the AUV might operate on the
surface. It may need to surface
to send or retrieve data or as
part of its emergency abort system. Once on the
sur face ,  the  AUV would  be  subjec t  to  the
COLREGs. 
For vessels less than twelve meters in length,
Rule 22 requires a masthead light, sternlight, and
towing light visible up to two miles; a sidelight visi-
ble up to one mile; and a white, red, green, or yellow
all-round light visible up to two miles. For vessel
more than twelve meters long but less than fifty
meters long, a masthead light, visible up to five
miles, is required unless the vessel is less than twen-
ty meters long. For vessels between twelve and
twenty meters long, the masthead light need only be
visible for three miles. A sidelight, sternlight, tow-
ing light, and a white, red, green or yellow all-round
light must also be visible for a range of two miles. 
Although it is unclear whether AUVs are sub-
ject to the maritime regulations for vessels, to
reduce damage and liability concerns, it is advis-
able for AUV operators to adhere to the COLREG
provisions dealing with lighting and signals when
the AUV is on the surface. While an AUV may not
be able to fully comply with these requirements
due to design limitations, comparable lighting
should be incorporated into the design whenever
possible. Failure to adhere to the international
lighting and signal requirements may result in a
maximum civil penalty of $5,000 which can be
assessed against both the vessel operator and the ves-
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Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
361 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2004).
Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.
In March, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
delayed the planned expansion of an oil refinery
dock in Washington State until the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) prepares a full
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and
reassesses the permit under the Magnuson
Amendment. This is a case of first impression with
respect to the Magnuson Amendment.
Background
In 1969, BP West Coast Products (BP) received a
permit from the Corps to build a dock for the
delivery of crude oil. BP’s refinery was built in
1971 in Cherry Point, Washington. The original
dock design called for two platforms, one for the
unloading of crude oil and one for loading the
refined product. During construction, however,
BP chose to build only the southern platform
which was altered to handled both the unloading
of crude and loading of refined product.
In 1992, BP applied for a permit from the
Corps to build the northern platform and return to
the refinery’s original plans for separate docks for
loading and unloading. During the public com-
ment period, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) expressed concern that the increase in
tanker traffic as a result of the expansion would
increase the possibility of a major oil spill. The
Lummi Indian Nation and the Nooksack Indian
Tribe expressed similar misgivings. 
On March 1, 1996, the Corps approved BP’s
permit application, finding that the construction
of the northern platform would not result in
adverse cumulative impacts to fish and wildlife
in the Cherry Point area. The Corps claimed that
the dock expansion would reduce the risk of oil
spill because of a decrease in tanker wait time
and the installation of oil spill containment
booms around the new platform.1 The Corps
determined that the expansion would not “signif-
icantly affect the quality of the human environ-
ment” and issued a Finding of No Significant
Impact (FONSI) under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) thereby excusing the
agency from preparing an EIS.2
In 1997, Ocean Advocates contacted the Corps
requesting a more thorough analysis of the cumu-
lative impacts of the dock expansion on vessel traf-
fic and whether the permit violated the Magnuson
Amendment3 which regulates permits for oil trans-
port terminals in Puget Sound. The Corps denied
both requests. Ocean Advocates submitted a sec-
ond request for reconsideration in 1999.
In 2000, the Corps granted BP a one-year
extension to its 1996 permit to complete construc-
tion, finding that the dock extension did not vio-
late the Magnuson Amendment because the exten-
sion would not increase the facility’s capacity to
offload crude oil. The Corps again determined
that an EIS was unnecessary. The northern plat-
form is currently operational. 
The Lawsuit
Ocean Advocates filed suit against the Corps in
November 2000 arguing that BP’s permit violated
the Magnuson Amendment and that the Corps
violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS. The
U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington granted summary judgment in favor
of the Corps and BP holding that an EIS was not
required because the northern platform would
alleviate existing vessel traffic problems and traf-
fic would increase regardless of BP’s planned
expansion. The court also agreed with the Corps
that the permit did not violate the Magnuson
Amendment. Ocean Advocates appealed the dis-
trict court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit.
Preliminary Matters
On appeal, BP argued that Ocean Advocates
lacked standing. To bring a cause of action in fed-
eral court, a plaintiff must show s/he has suffered
an “injury in fact” that is traceable to the chal-
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lenged action of the defendant and
redressable by a favorable decision.4
The Ninth Circuit held that Ocean
Advocates had standing. In environ-
mental cases, injury in fact is satisfied
if an individual or organization pro-
vides evidence “that she has an aes-
thetic or recreational interest in a par-
ticular place, or animal, or plant
species  and that  that  interest  is
impaired by a defendant’s conduct.”5
Ocean Advocates’ members have an
interest in the Cherry Point area for
recreation and wildlife viewing which
would be impaired by a major oil
spill, which is made more likely by
the construction of the northern plat-
form. The court found that Ocean
Advocates showed injury in fact clear-
ly traceable to BP’s proposed dock expansion.
Finally, Ocean Advocates’ injury is redressable
through court action because OA sought an
injunction to restrict tanker traffic which, if
granted, would reduce OA’s concerns regarding
spills and increased traffic.
BP also argued that OA’s action was barred on
the basis of laches. Laches is disfavored in envi-
ronmental cases, but it is an affirmative defense if
a defendant can show that the plaintiff lacked
diligence in pursuing her claim and that lack of
diligence resulted in prejudice to the defendant.
The Ninth Circuit held that laches does not bar
OA’s action, due to OA’s diligent pursuit of its
claim from the Corps’ issuance of the first permit
in 1996.
NEPA
Federal agencies must prepare an EIS for “major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment.”6 In situations where it
is unclear whether the federal action will signifi-
cantly affect the quality of the human environ-
ment, federal agencies may initially prepare an
Environmental Assessment (EA). If, through the
EA, the agency determines the action will signifi-
cantly affect the human environment, it must pre-
pare an EIS. If not, it may issue a FONSI. However,
an agency must prepare an EIS if significant ques-
tions are raised regarding whether a project “may
cause significant degradation of some human envi-
ronmental factor.”7
The Ninth Circuit was not persuaded that the
Corps took a “hard look” at the environmental
impacts of the proposed dock expansion. The
court held that the Corps failed, in both 1996 and
2000, to “provide any reason why an EIS was
unnecessary.”8 The Corps simply stated that the
project would not have a significant impact on the
quality of the human environment. Such a state-
ment alone, without supporting reasons, is insuffi-
cient to satisfy the NEPA requirements.
The court found that an EIS is required for the
dock expansion. First, in its communications with
the Corps, the court found that OA raised a sub-
stantial question regarding whether the northern
platform might cause significant degradation of
the environment. In addition, the court deter-
mined that the Corps failed to adequately exam-
ine the cumulative effects of multiple projects in
the Cherry Point area as required under 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.27(b)(7). Finally, an agency must prepare
an EIS when the effects of the project are highly
uncertain.9 The court determined that the Corps
did not have the necessary data to determine
whether tanker traffic would increase as a result
of the expansion and therefore should have pre-
pared an EIS.
See EIS, page 14
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Magnuson Amendment
Under the Magnuson Amendment,
No officer, employee, or other official of
the Federal Government shall, or shall
have authority to, issue, renew, grant, or
otherwise approve any permit, license,
or other authority for constructing, ren-
ovating, modifying, or otherwise altering
a terminal, dock, or other facility in, on,
or immediately adjacent to, or affecting
the navigable waters of Puget Sound, or
any other navigable waters in the State
of Washington east of Port Angeles,
which will or may result in any increase in
the volume of crude oil capable of being han-
dled at any such facility (measured as of
the date of enactment of this section
[Oct. 18, 1977]), other than oil to be
refined for consumption in the State of
Washington.10
BP claimed that the northern platform cannot
and would not be used to unload crude oil and,
therefore, the expansion did not increase the
amount of crude oil which could be handled.
However, the court held that the phrase “any such
facility” refers to more than the northern dock
expansion itself. The relevant question is whether
the permit enabled BP to increase the capacity of
its entire Cherry Point Marine Terminal to handle
more crude oil. 
The Ninth Circuit could not answer this ques-
tion because it was not clear from the record
whether the terms of BP’s permit limited BP’s abil-
ity to handle crude oil at the northern platform.
While BP argued that the platform was physically
incapable of handling crude oil, BP’s permit does
not clearly prohibit BP from modifying the new
platform to handle crude oil. If the permit allows
BP to modify the platform, then the Corps may
have increased the capacity of the Cherry Point
terminal to handle crude oil in violation of the
Magnuson Amendment. 
To determine whether the new platform could
handle crude oil, the court remanded the case to
the district court to answer the following questions:
1.  Is it physically possible for the new
platform to handle crude oil today?
2. Is is physically possible to modify the
new platform such that it could han-
dle crude oil, without requiring addi-
tional permitting?11
If the answer to either of these questions is yes,
then the permit violates the Magnuson Amend-
ment and is invalid. Stated another way, BP and
the Corps must prove on remand that the new plat-
form cannot handle crude oil without additional
permits from the Corps. 
The Ninth Circuit also directed the district
court to investigate whether the permit allowed BP
to increase the berthing capacity of the Cherry
Point Terminal. If so, the increased berthing capac-
ity could potentially increase the capacity of the
terminal to handle crude oil, again in violation of
the Magnuson Amendment.
Conclusion
Ocean Advocates had standing to bring suit against
BP and the Corps for violations of NEPA and the
Magnuson Amendment.  The Ninth Circuit
remanded the case to the district court directing
the Corps to (1) prepare a full EIS considering the
impact of reasonably foreseeable increases in
tanker traffic on the environment around the ter-
minal and (2) reevaluate the permit in light of a
potential Magnuson Amendment violation.
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sel itself. Proactive engineering may facilitate com-
pliance with the COLREGs and actually eliminate
the need to determine whether an AUV is a vessel.
While it is important for all vessels to comply
with the international collision regulations, not all
vessels can. The federal government does recog-
nize that some vessels have design limitations
which prevent full compliance. “Any requirement
of the [COLREGs] with respect to the number,
position, range, or arc of visibility of lights, with
respect to shapes, or with respect to the disposition
and characteristics of sound-signaling appliances,
shall not be applicable to a vessel of special con-
struction or purpose” when the Coast Guard certi-
fies that the “vessel cannot comply fully with that
requirement without interfering with the special
function of the vessel.”7 A “vessel of special con-
struction or purpose” is defined by the Coast
Guard as “a vessel designed or modified to per-
form a special function and whose arrangement is
thereby relatively inflexible.”8 If an AUV is a ves-
sel, it would probably qualify as a vessel of special
construction or purpose. 
Most AUVs are designed to carry out a specific
scientific purpose. Placing lights or whistles on an
AUV could easily interfere with the special func-
tion of the vessel, especially if these additions
interfere with the AUV’s ability to carry sensors.
“The owner, builder, operator, or agent of a ves-
sel of special construction or purpose who believes
that the vessel cannot fully comply” with the
COLREGs may seek an Alternative Compliance
Certificate from the Chief of the Marine Safety
Division of the Coast Guard District in which the
vessel is being built or operated.9 The application
must identify the vessel, describe the COLREG
provision for which the alternative compliance is
sought, and include “a description of the alterna-
tive installation that is in closest possible compli-
ance with the applicable” COLREG provision,
including a copy of the vessel’s plan or an accurate
scale drawing.10 Notice of the issuance of alterna-
tive compliance certificates by the Coast Guard
must be published in the Federal Register.11
Alternative compliance certificates may be
issued for a class of vessels.12 This provision could
be the answer to the COLREG dilemma the AUV
industry has been seeking. Designers and operators
of certain types of AUV could seek alternative com-
pliance certificates for particular groups of AUVs,
like the semi-submersibles. The Coast Guard
should understand the design limitations of AUVs
and work with the industry to develop acceptable
alternatives. These certificates would enable an
AUV to comply with the COLREGS without signif-
icantly altering its design.
Although a regulatory gap currently exists with
regard to AUVs, AUV operators should try to work
with the federal government to make the oceans a
safer place for both humans and animals. This
proactive approach may enable the industry to
postpone and even prevent regulation in the future,
saving research institutions and operators valuable
time and money. The wealth of data that AUVs
could collect is unfathomable. Hopefully, the use of
these little robots will continue to grow and enrich
the scientific knowledge of the world.
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Construction of Navy 
Landing Field Delayed
Washington County, N.C.  v. U.S. Dept. of the Navy,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8733 (E.D.N.C. April 19,
2004).
Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.
In April, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina enjoined the U.S. Navy
from taking further action associated with the con-
struction of a landing field near the Pocosin Lakes
National Wildlife Refuge (Pocosin NWR) pending
a decision on the merits in a lawsuit filed by the
Southern Environmental Law Center. 
Background
To support the operation and training of the new
“Super Hornet” aircraft, the U.S. Navy intends to
build an Outlying Landing Field (OLF) com-
pr i sed  o f  approx imate ly  23 ,000  ac re s  in
Washington County and 7,000 acres in Beaufort
County, North Carolina. The area, know as Site C,
is located just a few miles from the Pocosin NWR,
a waterfowl sanctuary providing winter habitat
for over 100,000 waterfowl, including 20,000 tun-
dra swans and 44,000 snow geese.1 The Navy esti-
mates that the OLF would be used for approxi-
mately 31,560 Field Carrier Landing Practice
operations per year.2
On January 9, 2004, the Southern Environ-
mental Law Center (SELC) filed suit on behalf of
the National Audubon Society, North Carolina
Wildlife Federation, and Defenders of Wildlife
challenging the Navy’s plan to construct a new
OLF at Site C. SELC claims that the Navy failed
to comply with the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), the Coastal Zone Management
Act ,  and the North Carolina Coastal  Area
Management Plan. In February, SELC filed for a
preliminary injunction to prevent the Navy from
moving ahead with its construction plans until
the court made a determination on the merits of
the case.
Preliminary Injunction Standard
A preliminary injunction is not the final determi-
nation of a case, but rather a temporary remedy to
preserve the status quo until a final ruling can be
made by the court. Usually, to obtain a preliminary
injunction, the moving party must establish: “(1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
irreparable injury to the [moving party] if the
injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury to
the [moving party] outweighs the injury to the
other party; (4) the injunction is not adverse to the
public interest.”3 No one factor is determinative.
In the Fourth Circuit, however, courts employ a
“hardship balancing test” that balances the likeli-
hood of harm to the plaintiff against the likelihood
of harm to the defendant.4 If the balance of harms
weighs in the plaintiff ’s favor, the plaintiff need
not demonstrate a likelihood of success.5 The
plaintiff simply needs to show that her claims raise
serious questions. 
Balance of Harms
The district court held that the balance of harm is
significantly weighted in the favor of the SELC.
The court stated that the SELC presented com-
pelling evidence that the construction of the OLF
at Site C would irreparably harm numerous swans
and snow geese through destruction of the natural
habitat on which they depend, increased noise, and
increased danger of collision. In addition, the
Navy’s acquisition of land for the OLF will
irreparably harm the citizens of Washington and
Beaufort counties by permanently displacing at
least one hundred families.
The likelihood of harm to the Navy, according
to the district court, is slight. The Navy is still in
the preliminary planning stage of this project and
has yet to purchase land or secure contractor bids.
Furthermore, the court was not persuaded by the
Navy’s primary argument that a construction delay
would irreparably harm the ability of the Navy to
conduct operations. Even without a delay, the OLF
would not be operational until 2007 and even the
Navy admitted in its Final Environmental Impact
Statement that “an OLF is not required to support
the homebasing alternatives at NAS Oceana.”6
Likelihood of Success
Because SELC demonstrated that the balance of
harms weighs in its favor, the district court only
needed to decide whether the questions presented
by SELC are “so serious, substantial, difficult, and
doubtful, as to make them fair ground for litiga-
tion.”7 The district court found that SELC raised
serious questions about whether the Navy acted
arbitrarily in deciding to construct the OLF at Site
C. SELC presented evidence that the Navy con-
ducted an insufficient analysis of the impact of the
OLF on the waterfowl at Pocosin NWR and that
the Navy’s findings in the issued environmental
impact statements might actually run counter to
evidence in front of the Navy at the time of its deci-
sion. SELC also presented evidence that the Navy
failed to adequately consider alternative sites for
the OLF.
Conclusion
The district court enjoined the Navy from taking
further action to construct a new OLF in North
Carolina because of the likelihood of harm to the
citizens of Washington and Beaufort counties and
waterfowl in nearby Pocosin NWR. Although the
Navy has a duty to maintain national security and
train its pilots, the court held that those duties do
not automatically prevail over the procedural
requirements of NEPA. Because the court was not
persuaded that a delay would cause the Navy or the
public tangible harm, the Navy was enjoined from
further action pending resolution of the case or
until further order of the court.
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shoreline erosion protection. One month later, the
Commission granted them a permit to construct a
rock revetment subject to nine conditions. Instead of
building a rock revetment, the seawall owners con-
structed a seawall and even made unauthorized
additions to the seawall at a later date. In 1986, an
adjacent landowner filed a lawsuit against the sea-
wall owners alleging that negligent construction and
maintenance of the seawall damaged her property.
The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the
adjacent landowner and ordered compensation of
$128,000. 
By 1996, two property owners south of the sea-
wall contacted state agencies to express concern
about the damage to their property caused by the
seawall and demand action. Consequently, the
Planning Department filed a petition to revoke,
amend or modify the SMA Use permit, alleging that
(1) the seawall was not constructed according to
approved plans; (2) the seawall owners failed to
obtain permits for additional development in con-
nection with the permitted project; and (3) the sea-
wall owners failed to comply with the SMA Use per-
mit condition.
After several public hearings, the Commission
concluded that the seawall did not conform to the
various conditions of the SMA Use permit. The
Commission ordered the seawall owners to (1) con-
duct a sand replenishment program for the area
immediately fronting the seawall, (2) alter the
southern portion of the seawall to limit flanking ero-
sion by providing a sloped, curved return rock revet-
ment, (3) offer the two southern property owners a
one-time sand replenishment program for the area
immediately fronting their properties, and (4) repair
the seawall and its surrounding areas. In August
1997, the seawall owners appealed the Commission’s
decision to the circuit court, which held that the
Commission lacked authority (1) to modify a condi-
tion of the SMA Use permit, and (2) to order injunc-
t ive  rel ief .  The Planning Department and
Commission appealed the circuit court’s ruling.
Modification of an Existing SMA Use Permit
The CZMA is a comprehensive State regulatory
scheme to protect the coastal environment of
Hawai‘i. The Supreme Court explained that the
State legislature is dedicated to the preservation,
protection and, when feasible, the restoration of
the natural resources within the coastal zone of
Hawai‘i. The legislature authorizes counties to
establish SMAs. The Court concluded that the
CZMA mandates that “the designated authority
seek to minimize, where reasonable . . . any devel-
opment which would reduce the size of any beach
or other area usable for public recreation.”2
The primary issue in this case is whether the
Commission had the authority to modify the SMA
Use permit previously issued to the seawall owners.
Morgan, one of the seawall owners, argued that the
circuit court properly held that the Commission
did not have the authority to amend a SMA Use
permi t  i s sued  many  year s  ago .  S ince  the
Commission’s enabling statute did not expressly
allow reconsideration, Morgan argued that the
Commission could not modify the permit. The
Commission countered that because it must admin-
ister the objectives and policies of the CZMA, the
Commission possesses continuing authority over
SMA Use permits to ensure compliance with the
CZMA.
The Commission also raised two other argu-
ments regarding its authority to reconsider a SMA
Use permit. First, it maintained that the circuit
court’s interpretation of HRS § 205A-29 would lead
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to an absurd result. This statute states in pertinent
part that “[a]ction on the special management per-
mit shall be final unless otherwise mandated by
court order.”3 The Commission argued that the cir-
cuit court’s interpretation of this language would
require the Commission to file a court action every
time a SMA Use permit requires modification.
Second, the Commission argued that PCRPP §§ 1-
12-8(b) and 1-12-9(b) expressly allow it to modify a
condition imposed by a permit. 
The  supreme court  concluded that  the
Commission did possess the inherent power to
reconsider a validly issued SMA Use permit for sev-
eral reasons. “Administrative tribunals possess the
inherent power of reconsideration of their judicial
acts” because “grave consequences” might occur if a
decision could not be recalled.4 The Court reasoned
that the Commission could not foresee every unex-
pected situation that could occur at the time of per-
mit issuance. In addition, the supreme court agreed
that the Commission’s enabling statute authorized
the Commission to carry out the goals and policies
of the CZMA and ensure its compliance. The
supreme court also agreed that the circuit court’s
interpretation of HRS § 205A-29 was unreasonable
and held that it would not allow an interpretation of
the statute that creates an absurd result. Finally, the
supreme court held that PCRPP §§ 1-12-8(b) and 1-
12-9(b) allow revocation and modification of a per-
mit if the permit holder does not comply with the
permit’s terms. Since the seawall owners did not
comply with the terms of the SMA Use permit, the
Commission could modify their SMA Use permit. 
Injunctive Relief
The second issue in the case is whether the
Commission had authority to order injunctive
relief. Morgan argued that, pursuant to HRS §
205A-33, only the circuit court possesses injunctive
power, and therefore, the Commission could not
order the seawall owners to perform any of the four
actions described above. The Commission coun-
tered that since it is vested with the authority to
implement the objectives and policies of the CZMA,
it could order injunctive relief. The supreme court
agreed in part with Morgan. 
Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 205A-33 states in
pertinent part “any person or agency violating any
provision of this chapter may be enjoined by the cir-
cuit court of the State . . .”5 This statute expressly
grants injunctive power to the circuit court, and
there is no provision in the CZMA which expressly
grants this power to a lead agency. The supreme
court found that directing Morgan to conduct the
sand replenishment program and offer a one-time
sand replenishment program to the two landowners
south of the seawall were injunctive remedies and
concluded that the Commission lacked authority to
order these two remedies.
The supreme court, however, concluded that
the Commission did have the authority to com-
mand Morgan to alter and repair the seawall
because these actions were not injunctive in nature.
Instead, the Court reasoned that by ordering these
two actions, the Commission intended to ensure
compliance with the original conditions of the
SMA Use permit. In addition, PCRPP 1-12-8(b)
expressly authorizes the Commission to “allow the
permit holder a reasonable opportunity to correct,
remedy or rectify the problem” if any condition has
been violated.6 The supreme court reasoned that
the Commission could have revoked Morgan’s per-
mit and concluded that by directing Morgan to
alter and repair the seawall, the Commission pro-
vided an opportunity to correct the problem.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that the
Commission has authority (1) to modify a validly
issued SMA Use permit for changed conditions,
and (2) to order Morgan to alter and repair the sea-
wall in order to rectify the damage to adjacent
properties. The supreme court also concluded that
the Commission improperly mandated injunctive
relief when the Commission ordered Morgan to
conduct a sand replenishment program and offer
the two southern property owners a one-time sand
replenishment.
Endnotes
1.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 205A-1 et seq. (2001).
2.  Id. at § 205A-26(3)(B) (2001).
3.  Id. at § 205A-29 (2001).
4.  Morgan v. Planning Department, County of Kauai,
86 P.3d 982, 992 (Haw. 2004).
5.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 205A-33 (2001).
6.  PCRPP 1-12-8(b) (2001).
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Alaska Trademark Shellfish, LLC, et. al. v. State of
Alaska, 2004 Alas. LEXIS 51, (Alaska April 16,
2004).
Jason Savarese, J.D.
The Supreme Court of Alaska recently held that
the Alaska Aquatic Farming Act and its operation
and stock acquisition permit provisions did not
give exclusive rights to geoduck farmers seeking to
harvest and sell pre-permit, wild shellfish found on
their farms.
Background
Alaska’s Aquatic Farming Act requires a permit in
order to open an aquatic farm in the state, and
gives the Alaska Department of Fish and Game
(the Department) power over permit issuance deci-
sions. The Department indicated to some potential
shellfish farmers that those receiving permits
would have the right to harvest all existing wild
shellfish on their farm when the permits were
issued. Alaska Trademark Shellfish, LLC, (ATS)
and other farmers applied for aquatic farm permits
from the Alaska Department of Fish and Game.
ATS wanted to farm a type of slow-growing shell-
fish of considerable size, with high market value,
known as geoducks. The Department considered
the permit requests, and conditionally approved
them, upon the farmers’ development of a way to
differentiate between “common property” geo-
ducks already in the farmers’ waters, and the new
clams they intended to grow. 
The concern expressed by the Department’s
condition was that farmers might have a high-
er-than-necessary density of pre-permit geoducks
on their farm, and that these should remain an
Alaskan common property resource for “other
uses.” ATS objected to the condition, and offered
some alternatives. The Department rejected the
alternatives, and relayed to ATS the general prin-
ciples the Department would use in deciding
ATS’s permit applications. These included limit-
ing the use of pre-permit geoducks to “brood stock
or for active cultivation.” These principles were
later proposed and officially adopted as regula-
tions in the Alaska Administrative Code.1 ATS
claimed the condition attached to the clam per-
mits would preclude any geoduck farming, and
ATS demanded their applications be approved
without condition. The Department denied their
permit applications.
The Lawsuit
ATS appealed the Department’s decision to the
superior court, putting forth two claims. First, ATS
claimed that the Department was in violation of
the Alaskan Aquatic Farming Act, by requiring
those seeking to open a shellfish farm to maintain
pre-permit shellfish as common use property. In
addition, ATS asserted an estoppel charge against
the Department, since it had assured potential
farmers that once a permit was obtained, any exist-
ing, wild geoducks would be harvestable. The supe-
rior court upheld the Department’s decision.
Reasoning its decision on a constitutional
basis, the superior court found that the “real ques-
tion . . . is not whether the legislature intended to
allow [stock acquisition permit] holders to harvest
wild stock, but whether the legislature is permitted
to do so.”2 The judge held that the state constitu-
tion’s “common use” clause barred ATS from hav-
ing the exclusive right to harvest wild geoducks.
ATS appealed the decision to the Supreme Court
of Alaska.
The Supreme Court heard ATS’s arguments
that the superior court had misapplied the com-
mon use clause in the Alaska Constitution and the
public use doctrine in not allowing farmers to har-
vest existing geoduck stocks on the property. ATS
claimed that wild geoducks would qualify as
“farmed” shellfish under the statutory definition of
“stock,” and that the stock acquisition permit
statute allows the harvesting of wild geoducks to
make such farming viable. ATS also reiterated its
estoppel assertion against the Department. 
No Exclusive Rights to Harvest
Wild Alaskan Shellfish
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Alaska Trademark Shellfish’s Arguments
ATS explained that the Aquatic Farming Act’s
statutory definition of “stock” as those “intended
for use…for…further growth or propagation”3
included wild geoducks, since some growth would
occur between the time the permit was issued and
the time of harvesting. The Court found this argu-
ment to be without merit, and stated that an actual
intent to “use” the wild clams “for” further growth
was required.4 Just allowing the clams to continue
their natural growth is not enough to bring wild
geoducks under the “stocks” statutory definition.
ATS argued that the stock acquisition permit
statute commanded the Department to issue such a
permit if “wild stock is necessary to meet the initial
needs of farm or hatchery stock.”5 In their view, for
commercial geoduck farming to succeed, wild, pre-
permit geoducks would have to be harvested. This
argument proved unpersuasive; as the Court point-
ed out the statute only addressed the farm’s need
for stock, not for “general startup needs.”6 Thus,
the statute did not give the farmers a right to har-
vest wild, existing geoducks on the property.
With regard to the estoppel claim, the Court
declined to rule on the disputed meaning of state-
ments made by the Department before permit appli-
cations were filed. The justices simply found, under
a “totality of the circumstances test”, that estoppel
was not appropriate. The Alaskan Court decided the
case without considering the Alaska Constitution’s
common use clause
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out a section of the
Aquatic Farming Act which specifically allows the
Department’s commissioner to “attach conditions
to a permit issued under this section that are neces-
sary to protect natural fish and wildlife resources.”7
The Court went on to hold that the statute govern-
ing operation permits does not include an implied
right to take wild shellfish. The Court did not
reach the issue of whether the grant of such an
exc lus ive  r igh t  would  v io la te  the  A laska
Constitution. The decision of the Department of
Fish and Game to  deny Alaska Trademark
Shellfish’s geoduck farming permit application
was upheld.
Endnotes
1.  ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 41, §240 (2003).
2.  Alaska Trademark Shellfish, LLC, et. al. v. State of
Alaska, et. al., 2004 Alas. LEXIS 51, at *8 (Alaska
April 16, 2004).
3.  ALASKA STAT. § 16.40.199(8) (2003). 
4.  Alaska Trademark Shellfish, 2004 Alas. LEXIS 51,
at *19. 
5.  ALASKA STAT. § 16.40.120(f) (2003).
6.  Alaska Trademark Shellfish, 2004 Alas. LEXIS 51,
at *20
7.  ALASKA STAT. § 16.40.100(c) (2003).
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In The Outlaw Sea, William Langewiesche details
the chaotic world of international shipping.
Despite numerous treaties and oversight by power-
ful international bodies like the International
Maritime Organization, the ocean remains a law-
less realm. More than forty thousand large mer-
chant vessels ply the open ocean with little or no
regulation. According to Langewiesche, these mer-
chant vessels “are possibly the most independent
objects on earth, many of them without allegiances
of any kind, frequently changing their identity and
assuming whatever nationality - or ‘flag’ - allows
them to proceed as they please.” 
The ocean today is not much safer then it was
400 years ago. Terrorism is a significant concern,
piracy is on the rise in some areas such as Southeast
Asia, and aging vessels break apart in storms
threatening both the lives of the crews and the nat-
ural environment. It is almost impossible to police
the world’s oceans. No country has the manpower
or the ships needed to adequately patrol beyond the
horizon. Even if it was possible to patrol the
oceans, ships can easily hide in plain sight simply
by changing names, flags, and/or color. 
In many cases, design modifications are neces-
sary to ensure mariner safety and prevent environ-
mental disasters such as oil spills. Adoption, let
alone enforcement, of international standards is
difficult to achieve, as Langewiesche  highlights by
examining the efforts of the United States, and
later the European Union, to phase out single-hull
tankers. Langewiesche also examines the current
controversy surrounding shipbreaking in India and
other developing nations.
The Outlaw Sea, however, does more than docu-
ment the failures of the international community
to regulate shipping. Langewiesche pays homage to
the victims of some of the most shocking maritime
disasters in recent years. From the sinking of the
passenger ferry Estonia in 1994, which claimed the
lives of at least 852 people,  to the loss of the Kristal,
an all-purpose tanker, in 2001 due to a broken hull,
Langewiesche describes in stunning detail the
price that is paid, in both human lives and environ-
mental damage, when things go wrong. 
A significant portion of The Outlaw Sea is
devoted to the sinking of the Estonia. With power-
ful prose, Langewiesche reconstructs the events of
that terrifying night, shares the stories of some of
the survivors and the victims, examines the acci-
dent investigation, and even  investigates the con-
spiracy theory of a German journalist. Through
eyewitness accounts, Langewiesche recreates the
chaos and terror that reigns on a sinking ship and
reminds us all that sailors and passengers have
names, families, lives.
The Outlaw Sea is a frightening glimpse into
the anarchic world of international shipping.
Terrorist organizations finance their operations by
transporting goods on vessels fully compliant with
international regulations. Vessels break apart and
sink weeks after passing inspection by reputable
inspectors. Vessels are hijacked by barefoot pirates.
In an age when governments often espouse the
belief that additional regulations will make the
world a safer place, Langewiesche forces readers to
face the fact that “our world is an ocean world, and
it is wild.”
Book Review . . .
Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.
The Outlaw Sea:  A World of
Freedom, Chaos, and Crime
William Langewiesche (North Point Press 2004).
NOAA is currently accepting comments on a rulemaking petition submitted by
Oceana urging the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to promulgate a
rule to protect deep-sea coral and sponge habitats in the U.S. exclusive eco-
nomic zone. Oceana claims the deep-sea habitats are vulnerable to destructive
fishing practice like bottom trawling and are not adequately protected by the
federal government through existing fishery management plans. Oceana wants
NMFS to initiate a mapping effort to identify the location of deep-sea coral
and sponge habitats; designate areas with high concentrations of deep sea coral
and sponges as habitat areas of particular concern and essential fish habitat;
close certain deep-sea areas to bottom trawling; and enhance monitoring and
enforcement. NMFS is accepting comments until August 13, 2004. Oceana’s
petition is available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/habitat/habitatconservation/DSC_petition/Oceana . 
A New York federal court recently sentenced three men to prison for illegally harvesting and exporting
Chilean sea bass and rock lobster into the United States. Arnold Bengis, David Bengis, and Jeffrey Noll
faced a variety of charges, including illegally harvesting sea bass and rock lobster in excess of quotas, ille-
gally exporting the harvested seafood to the United States, under-reporting the catch to South African
authorities, and bribing South African fisheries inspectors. Arnold Bengis and his son, David, were
ordered to forfeit a total of $5.9 million to the U.S. government. Arnold was sentenced to 46 months in
prison, while David received 12 months. Noll was ordered to forfeit $1.5 million and sentenced to 30
months.
NOAA’s new National Estuaries Restoration Inventory (NERI) is now on-line at https://neri.noaa.gov/ .
NERI, a product of the NOAA Habitat Restoration Program, was created to track estuary restoration pro-
jects across the nation and serve as a searchable source of information on restoration results. Federal,
state, local, and private entities are encouraged to submit projects to the inventory as long as the project
goal is to restore ecosystem benefits to estuaries and associated habitats. NOAA anticipates that the
inventory will grow to include an interactive mapping feature which would allow visitors to create cus-
tomized maps. 
Around the Globe
In late June, an Ecuadorean judge overturned limits in the sea
cucumber fishery in the Galapagos Islands, following a strike
by artisanal fishermen. On June 3, fishermen from Isabela
Island took over the offices of Galapagos National Park in
protest of the sea cucumber quota set by the Ecuadorean gov-
ernment. Authorities had set the quota at 4 million for a 60-day
period in 2004 and banned harvesting during 2005-2006. On
June 3, 2004, the artisanal fishermen of Isabela Island took over
the offices of Galapagos Island National Park, destroyed some
property, and prevented tourists from disembarking in the
Galapagos to protest the new regulations which they claimed denied them of their constitutional right to
make a living as fishermen. The environmental community is expected to appeal.
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